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NOTES
A Sectarian School Asserts Its Religious Beliefs;
Have the Courts Narrowed the Constitutional
Right to Free Exercise of Religion?
The United States Supreme Court, in denying certiorari, has
allowed to stand a Fifth Circuit opinion which held that the
segregationist policies of a sectarian school were not religious and,
therefore, not protected by the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. This holding arose out of a section 1981 action by a
black family whose children were turned away when they at-
tempted to enroll. The author argues that the decision was based
on erroneous analysis and has resulted in a dangerous narrowing
of the scope of constitutional protection of religious freedom.
A black family attempted to enroll its children in Dade Chris-
tian Schools, an affiliate of the New Testament Baptist Church.
The school requested the family to honor a policy of nonintegration,
which was based on a religious belief that interracial socialization
and marriage were in conflict with Biblical teachings. The plaintiffs
brought an action under the thirteenth amendment' through section
1981 of title 42 of the United States Code,2 alleging that the school
refused to contract with them. The defendants relied on the defense
of free exercise of religion under the first amendment. The district
court held in favor of the plaintiffs, stating that the segregation
policy was not religious and, therefore, not protected under the first
amendment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held, affirmed: The actions of the school were nonreli-
gious and were not protected by the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1235 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court first applied section 1981 to
private contracts in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.3 It held that the
statute fell under the thirteenth amendment and thereby avoided
the issue of state action. The Court further expanded its application
of section 1981 in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Association,I where it held that a private club which solicited mem-
1. The thirteenth amendment reads in pertinent part: 'Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude ... shall exist within the United States .... Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The pertinent language is: "All persons ... shall have the
same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens."
3. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
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bership from the public could not discriminate against blacks. In
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency ' the statute was applied to
private employment contracts. The Court continued its battle
against racial discrimination in education when it ruled that section
1981 applies to private secular schools in Runyon v. McCrary.'
In Runyon, the Court had to decide whether the statute was
constitutional as applied to defenses of right to privacy, freedom of
association, and due process. The scope of section 1981 was given
broad application when seven justices agreed that the interest of the
government outweighed the interest of the parents and students of
the defendants' schools.7
The Supreme Court, however, pointed out that it did not re-
solve the question raised by defendant in the instant case. The
Court stated, "They [the questions before the Court] do not even
present the application of § 1981 to private sectarian schools that
practice racial exclusion on religious grounds."' The Court then
noted, "[T]he Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is thus
in no way here involved."' This appears to have been in response to
an amicus curiae brief filed by Dade Christian Schools which re-
quested such exclusive language'" in the Runyon opinion. Since the
Dade Christian case was still on appeal to the Fifth Circuit," a
decision on this question by the Supreme Court would have resulted
in an usurpation of the authority of the court of appeals. Given the
background of this case law Dade Christian will be examined in
greater detail.
On July 25, 1973, Mrs. Marice Brown attempted to enroll her
two daughters in Dade Christian School. She and her daughters
were taken to a private room and handed a printed card stating the
school's policy of nonintegration.' 2 The Browns left the premises
allegedly embarrassed and humiliated.
A complaint was filed in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida whereby the Brown family alleged
5. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
6. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
7. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion. Justices Powell and Stevens concurred,
but questioned the applicability of section 1981 to private contracts. Justices Rehnquist and
White dissented, expressing the belief that Jones and the cases which followed it were incor-
rectly decided and should be overruled.
8. 427 U.S. at 167.
9. Id. at 167 n.6.
10. Amicus Curiae Brief at 27, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
11. Runyon was decided on June 25, 1976, and the circuit court's decision in Dade
Christian was not issued until July 25, 1977.
12. The text of the statement read: "We are sorry ... But the policy of the school is
one of non-integration and we would request that you respect this policy." 556 F.2d at 311.
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violations of its civil rights. The Dade Christian School and several
key persons in its organization'3 filed an amended answer setting up
several affirmative defenses." Prior to trial, the parties stipulated
that the sole remaining claim of the plaintiffs would be based upon
a right to contract theory under section 1981.'" The defense denied
applicability of section 1981 to purely private contracts and asserted
protection under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.'"
Each party stipulated to the admission of pretrial depositions
and other documentary evidence. No evidentiary hearing for the
purpose of taking testimony was held by the district court. There
was little issue as to the fact that the school's policy was discrimina-
tory and that the Browns were subjected to that discrimination.
Therefore, the crucial evidence centered on the first amendment
defense.
The school was founded by the New Testament Baptist Church
in 1962, in response to the removal of Bible readings from the public
schools. This was just prior to the Supreme Court rulings on that
subject. 7 Integration was not a real problem at that time, therefore,
there was no policy established by the school concerning segrega-
tion. The school solicited students through the yellow pages; how-
ever, each parent was required to sign a form agreeing to adhere to
the beliefs of the school before the student could be enrolled.'
As the pressures toward integration intensified in society, the
members of the church'9 voted a policy of segregation. This was in
response to the belief by the leaders of the school and the church
that the Bible dictated that interracial socialization and marriage
were wrong.20 The leaders felt that integration in the school could
13. Included in this group were A. C. Janney, the pastor of the New Testament Baptist
Church and president of Dade Christian Schools, Inc.; John M. Kalapp, an original incorpo-
rator of the school and past officer and business manager; V. S. Ackerman, the original
secretary-treasurer of the school; and Arthur E. Kreft, the principal of the school. Brief for
Appellant at 3.
14. The three defenses were: (1) there was no state action involved; (2) the school
was not a place of public accommodation; and (3) the school's discriminatory actions were
protected by the free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment and by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Brief for Appellant at 9-10.
15. See note 2 supra.
16. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
17. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 402 (1964); School
Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
18. The first belief on the form stated that the Bible is the infallible word of God. 556
F.2d at 319 n.l (Goldberg, J., concurring).
19. The school was affiliated with and located on the property of the New Testament
Baptist Church, an independent congregationalist church.
20. Specifically, the church based its segregationist beliefs on Biblical references to
God's dealings with the nation of Israel, the Tower of Babel, the confusion of the tongues in
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lead to such a result.2 The board of the school thereafter applied
the policy of nonintegration to the school. The leaders, however,
admitted that the enrollment of blacks would merely erode the exer-
cise of their religion rather than destroy it.
With this factual background, the district court found that sec-
tion 1981 applied to private schools,2" and the school's exclusion of
blacks was based on policy or philosophy rather than generally held
religious beliefs. Thus, the application of section 1981 infringed
upon no constitutional right of the defendants. This ruling made
it unnecessary to resolve the third issue which raised the conflict
between the plaintiff's rights under the thirteenth amendment
through section 1981 and the defendants' rights under the free exer-
cise clause of the first amendment. The court thereby avoided an
issue of first impression.24
These three issues were taken to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals to be heard en banc. However, before oral argument, the
Supreme Court in Runyon settled the issue of section 1981's applica-
tion to private schools, reaching the same result as the district court
had in Dade Christian. The court of appeals in Dade Christian
proved quite divided on the remaining question of religious protec-
tion under the first amendment. Only a plurality was able to agree
that the district court had ruled correctly and for the right reasons. 5
The plurality, in finding that the actions of the school were not
religious, reasoned:
The printed card handed to Mrs. Brown at the school expressly
stated the racial exclusion to be based on policy ...
We agree with the trial judge that the indication that the
contested belief would be subject to change upon the direction of
the congregation comports with the social or political nature of
the exclusionary policy.
• ..[The principal of the school stated,] "I don't know of
a specific position, other than policy directives."
the Book of Acts, and God's division of the races in the Book of Acts.
21. The school also had a policy of omitting multi-ethnic pictures from its educational
materials.
22. The Runyon case, which resolved this issue when it went to the Supreme Court, had
only been decided in the Fourth Circuit at the time of the district court's ruling. See McCrary
v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975).
23. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 7-21, Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556
F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
24. A similar finding was made in Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh Day-
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
25. Judge Hill wrote the opinion for the plurality.
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. . . [An incorporating officer stated,] "I think it was some-
thing that evolved as a philosophy and a policy over a period of
a number of meetings."
. . . [T]he leaders "decided that a school philosophy
needed to be adopted . .2.6.
Finally the plurality held, "[T]he trial judge's conclusion that
school segregation was nothing more than a recent policy developed
in response to the growing issue of segregation and integration was
amply supported by the evidence.
'27
Such analysis is questionable. This becomes obvious in that a
majority of the court felt that the district court erred in finding as
fact that the segregation policy of the school was nonreligious. Nev-
ertheless, the district court's ruling was affirmed because two of the
judges in this majority 8 agreed with the ultimate decision of the
lower court. The remaining judges favored remand to the lower
court to resolve the conflict between the federal interest in applying
section 1981 and the school's interest in the free exercise of religion.29
Thus, the court of appeals also avoided resolving the critical issue
left open in Runyon.
A petition for certiorari was filed with the United States Su-
preme Court by Dade Christian Schools. The petition alleged, inter
alia, that the district and circuit courts erred in holding that the
beliefs of the school were not religious.3" The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, thus letting stand the holding in the lower courts.3 ' In
light of the significant effect this case may have on other cases
involving institutional free exercise of religion, it is essential to ana-
lyze the correctness of the Fifth Circuit's decision.
The separation of church and state has created a wide array of
cases on varying subjects. The conflict caused by this separation has
been resolved in such diverse areas as conscientious objection, 32 po-
lygamy33 and Bible reading in public schools.34 In each case a de-
fense of the individual's right of free exercise was asserted. Dade
26. 556 F.2d at 312-13 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 313.
28. Judge Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion, joined in part by Chief Judge Brown.
29. Judge Roney, who wrote the dissent, was joined by Judges Gerwin, Coleman, Ains-
worth, Clark, and Tjoflat.
30. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Dade Christian Schools, Inc. v. Brown, 98 S. Ct.
1235 (1978).
31. Dade Christian Schools, Inc. v. Brown, 98 S. Ct. 1235 (1978).
32. E.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
33. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
34. See note 17 supra.
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Christian, on the other hand, was an action by an institution which
was asserting those individual rights. The district court and plural-
ity of the circuit court therefore sought to find some institutional
belief as a basis for the school's policy. This analysis was erroneous,
and led to an errant conclusion that the school's policy was nonreli-
gious. The plurality rejected the reasoning of Wisconsin v. Yoder 5
on the ground that it only dealt with "actions of individuals".3 6 It
is unfortunate that the plurality found such a distinction, for the
reasoning in Yoder37 was extremely sound and can easily be adapted
to fit institutional actions with only slight modification.
The following issues are presented to set the case in its proper
perspective and lead to a correct resolution of the ultimate conflict
between the first and thirteenth amendments.
First, the court should have resolved whether the members of
a church and school had a religious belief against interracial sociali-
zation and marriage. The plurality failed to distinguish properly
between the act of segregation and the belief in segregation. 3 The
court considered the congregation, when voting to segregate the
school, to be establishing its beliefs rather than exercising its beliefs
through that action. The plurality viewed the decision to segregate
as a newly expressed belief which arose from the pressure of integra-
tion. 9 The court felt that although the members believed in segrega-
tion, the beliefs were not religious. Therefore, their actions based
upon those beliefs could not have been in the exercise of their reli-
gion. This is the result of a very narrow interpretation of what con-
stitutes religious beliefs.
The definition of religion is not easily resolved by the courts,
for "[i]ndeed, a succinct and comprehensive definition of that con-
cept would appear to be a judicial impossibility."4 The Supreme
Court, however, had established some helpful guidelines for the
Dade Christian case. One criteria has been the sincerity of the reli-
gious belief.4 In Yoder, where the sincerity of the belief was stipu-
lated, the Supreme Court expanded its inquiry to consider the
35. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For an analysis of the Yoder test, see 11 DuQ. L. REv. 433, 437-
38 (1973); 51 N.C.L. REv. 302, 303-06 (1972); 48 NOTE DAME LAW. 741, 748-49 (1973).
36. 556 F.2d at 313.
37. 406 U.S. at 214-29.
38. The Supreme Court has required that the courts recognize and distinguish between
act and belief. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
39. 556 F.2d at 313.
40. Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974).
41. 406 U.S. at 209 (state stipulated sincerity for purpose of resolution); United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1944) (honest belief and good faith).
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source of the belief. Beliefs are religious where they are found to
have arisen from the defendant's literal interpretation of the Bible.'
In Dade Christian, it was uncontested that the leadership of the
church and school believed that the Bible dictated against interra-
cial socialization and marriage.
In Remmers v. Brewer' the district court held that a group
called the Church of the New Song, organized in prison and believ-
ing in "Eclat" as an inanimate supreme being, was expressing reli-
gious beliefs under the Constitution." If a federal court could find
that the Church of the New Song was religious, certainly the beliefs
of the leaders, members, and patrons of the New Testament Baptist
Church and Dade Christian School could have been so classified.
The testimony was unrefuted that the members of the church
believed that interracial socialization and marriage were wrong.
Yet, the plurality ignored these beliefs and attempted to find
whether some institutional belief existed. The Dade Christian
School was a corporation, and a corporate entity cannot believe. It
is the individuals in such an organization who develop and espouse
their beliefs. It then becomes a duty of the corporation to act on
those beliefs. The school's statement of beliefs was not an institu-
tional belief, but rather an expression of the individuals' beliefs.
These segregative beliefs, derived from the Bible, were religious.45
This analysis leads directly into the second issue which must
be addressed: was the Dade Christian School acting properly in the
effectuation of the religious beliefs of the members and patrons of
the church and school? If the school was acting in such a capacity,
it should have been able to assert protection under the free exercise
clause."
Unfortunately the plurality continually attempted to institu-
tionalize the belief, and was thus able to view the action of the
school as one of "policy" rather than religion. There seemed to be
an underlying assumption that a "policy" could not be religious.
Such an assumption would be erroneous.
42. 406 U.S. at 216. See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
43. 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1012 (1974).
44. Contra, Theriault v. Silber, 391 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Tex. 1 975); Theriault v. Carlson,
339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated a~nd remanded, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974).
45. It is also interesting to note that the plurality left the impression that religious beliefs
can only materialize and float down from heaven. However, "religious principles need not be
etched in stone or handed down from Sinai." Dade Christian at 318 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
46. Judge Goldberg viewed this as a standing issue which would lead to a similar resolu-
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Consider a policy established by Orthodox Judaism. That reli-
gious group believes that men and women should sit separately at
religious services, with the women usually sitting in the rear. If a
woman were to bring a suit asserting a civil rights violation, could
the courts find the practice to be mere "policy" and therefore not
religious? Such a finding would be absurd. Segregation of the sexes
here is clearly protected under the free exercise clause.
How could the plurality have concluded that the school's acts
were not in effectuation of the members' religious beliefs? One rea-
son is that it failed to consider those beliefs and continued to view
the institutional action as the institutional belief. To this end it
sought facts to resolve the question.
One fact upon which the plurality of the circuit court relied was
that the segregationist policy was relatively newfounded. When one
considers the Catholic Church and its policy on birth control, the
flaw in this argument becomes obvious. The Catholic Church has
long opposed artificial methods of birth control. When new methods
of birth control, such as the pill, were introduced, the Church an-
nounced its policy regarding the innovation.47 No one would assert
that the Catholic Church's stand is "policy" and, therefore, not
religious, merely because it is newfounded. 5 Similarly, Dade Chris-
tian let its policy on segregation be known once societal pressures
created a need for expressing that policy. Here the religion was only
twenty-two years old,49 yet the belief in segregation through a literal
Biblical interpretation could have existed from the beginning.
The plurality also relied on the fact that the decision to segre-
gate was made by a vote of the members of the church and "would
be subject to change upon the direction of the congregation."50 The
court focused on the right fact but with the wrong application. In a
church based on a hierarchical structure, the dictates come from a
central figure. The Supreme Court has unquestionably accepted
these decisions as a matter of faith.' The New Testament Baptist
Church, however, was an unaffiliated, congregationalist church.
tion. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 174-75; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535-36 (1925).
47. Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pope Paul VI On the Regulation of Birth (July 25,
1968).
48. If Congress passed a statute requiring all people to use one of these forms of contra-
ception for the purpose of population control, would the courts rule that the Catholic Church's
position is nonreligious and therefore not protected under the free exercise clause?
49. 556 F.2d at 325.
50. 556 F.2d at 312.
51. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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Congregationalism is defined as "a system of church government in
which the local congregation has full control and final authority over
church matters within its own area."52 The vote taken by the congre-
gation was its own determination as to the application of its reli-
gious beliefs and should be so recognized.53 Judge Goldberg best
summed up this concept when he stated, "I cannot emphasize too
strongly how grievously I believe the plurality errs by unconsciously
importing into its test for defining 'religion' its own views about how
a church should be organized."54
If the vote had any significance, and it should have, then al-
though the plurality did not have to reach the second issue, they
would have clearly resolved it when they stated: "Conversely, a
school or church which holds racial segregation as a religious tenet
should not be barred from asserting a free exercise defense to a
section 1981 claim merely because some of its patrons or members
might individually believe racial segregation is morally wrong."55
Therefore, the school's policy, which arose out of the unanimous
vote by the congregation's members in effectuation of their religious
beliefs against interracial socialization and marriage, should be pro-
tected under the free exercise clause. If the court had addressed the
issues in this two step process, first ascertaining the existence of
belief and then ascertaining whether the actions were indeed based
on that belief, the result would surely have been that the nature of
the "policy" was the exercise of belief.
The final issue was whether the plaintiff's thirteenth amend-
ment right through section 1981 outweighed the rights of the school
and its members under the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment." Although the lower courts never reached this issue, it still
remains important to address the test which should have been ap-
plied to this problem. It is well accepted that government may not
interfere with religious beliefs.57 However, the activities of the group
or individuals of the group, even when religiously founded, are sub-
52. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 478 (15th unabr. ed. 1966).
53. An action on belief may be religious even if the belief is not shared by others in that
religion. See generally Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (In Negre v. Larsen, the
companion case, a Catholic claimed religious objection to "unjust" wars. The Court accepted
a stipulation by the parties that the belief was religious even though there was no evidence
to show a sharing of that belief by other Catholics).
54. 556 F.2d at 317.
55. 556 F.2d at 314.
56. In Runyon, the Supreme Court stated the issue as, "[Wihether § 1981 ...is
constitutional as so applied." 427 U.S. at 168.
57. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
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ject to state and federal regulation." The Supreme Court has recog-
nized these premises as articulated by Thomas Jefferson when he
interpreted the free exercise clause of the first amendment to have
the effect that "legislative powers of government reach actions only
and not opinions."59
The Supreme Court has, had a long history of resolving the
legislative power to control religious actions." There seem to be two
primary areas of conflict. The first is the area of conscientious objec-
tion,6 where the Court weighs the right of free exercise against the
power of Congress to raise an army.62 The second area deals with
schools,6" where the Court weighs the right of free exercise against
the interest of the states in education.64 Through these decisions, the
Supreme Court has developed a balacing test to resolve the conflict.
In Yoder, the Supreme Court balanced the extent of the adverse
effect which the legislation had on the group's free exercise of reli-
gion against the state's interest which compelled the specific legisla-
tion. When the Court weighed the two interests, it found that the
group's free exercise of religion had the greater weight.
Legislation has come in conflict with the exercise of other con-
stitutional rights. In NAACP v. Alabama,65 the Supreme Court held
that the association members' right to freedom of association out-
weighed the interest of Alabama in protecting its citizens. In Roe
v. Wade,6" the Court held that the right of privacy outweighed the
interests of Texas in protecting health and potential life. In Meyer
v. Nebraska,67 the Court held that the right of due process out-
weighed the interests of Nebraska in the educational process. In
each case, a similar balancing test was applied.
The above decisions have not faced the conflict when the gov-
ernment's interest originates from the federal power to protect con-
stitutional rights of an individual. Section 1981 has such an origin
in the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment. 6 It would seem
58. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
59. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961).
60. As early as 1878, the Supreme Court faced a conflict in Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) (statute outlawing polygamy in conflict with Morman beliefs).
61. E.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
63. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
64. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
65. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
68. See note 1 supra.
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that the constitutional origin of section 1981 based on a fundamen-
tal right would create an even greater interest on the part of the
government. There is an indication that when a statute derives
power from a fundamental right, the courts have granted extraordi-
nary power to the statute. 9
Runyon v. McCrary appears to be the first Supreme Court case
to match section 1981 against individual .constitutional rights. In
Runyon, the Court was forced to resolve .whether the individual
rights as protected by section 1981 outweighed the rights of associa-
tion, privacy,7" and due process.7 In addressing the freedom of asso-
ciation issue, the Court analogized it to freedom of religion whereby
the beliefs are universally protected but the acts are subject to the
legislative process." The Court held that discrimination outweighed
the protection of the school's action.73 The Court then held that the
right of privacy through parental interest in children was also out-
weighed by governmental interests in discriminatory practices.74
The Court dealt the final blow when it held that the enforcement
of section 1981 "infringes no parental right" to due process. 5
It is apparent from the Runyon decision that the Supreme
Court has placed a strong compelling governmental interest in the
effectuation of section 1981. Any challenge will require a substantial
showing of irreparable harm to the institution and its members.
Such a showing was made in the Yoder case to enable the Amish
community to overcome the state's compelling interest in compul-
sory education." In addition, the Yoder Court gave great weight to
the fact that the church members believed that the law was a threat
to their religious salvation.77
The law which was developed by the district and circuit courts
in Dade Christian appears questionable if not erroneous, even
though it is unlikely that the school's interest was compelling
69. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to a-6 (1970), and its power under the fourteenth amendment.
70. 427 U.S. at 177. The parental interests are an extension of the procreative rights
which are protected under the right of privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. 427 U.S. at 176. The right to "bring up children" is included under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
72. See notes 57 & 58 supra.
73. 427 U.S. at 175-76.
74. Id. at 176-79.
75. Id. at 177. This view, however, seems contradictory in that a parent can send a
student "to educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desira-
ble." Id. at 176.
76. The Supreme Court found that compulsory education beyond the eighth grade would
"ultimately result in the destruction of the Old World Amish church community." 406 U.S.
at 212.
77. 406 U.S. at 209.
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enough to overcome section 1981, had the courts addressed the con-
flict. The danger lies in the method by which this case may narrow
the constitutional protection of religious rights. In failing to recog-
nize the religious underpinnings of a small religious institution's
actions, the court allowed the government to control religious be-
havior without facing the restrictions of the first amendment.
There are two possible sources for the error in the district and
circuit courts' reasoning. The first source of error appears to lie in
the arguments of the parties themselves.18 The evidence consisted
solely of deposition and documentation. Although this might be
adequate in some cases, the distinction between individual acts and
institutional acts relied upon by the plurality in Dade Christian
made it essential to show clearly the truly religious beliefs of the
members of the church and school.
Finally, it appears that the courts did not want the task of
resolving a sensitive area of the law, which would break new ground.
The subject of religious freedom has always been one of contro-
versy. 9 Discrimination legislation, too, has been a hotbed of litiga-
tion. 0 By ruling that the school's acts were not religious, the courts
effectively mooted the issue of conflict.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, and as a
result thereof, the law established in Dade Christian remains. In
considering the weight which one might attach to this denial, it
should be noted that the respondent changed his original position
and asserted that the lower courts erred in their determination that
the school's acts were not religious.' Even though the respondent
maintained that his section 1981 rights should prevail over the peti-
tioner's first amendment rights, the Courtmay have felt that the
adversarial nature of the review was destroyed. Whatever the rea-
sons, it is unfortunate that a case where the plaintiff only sought to
"make the point that the school should not discriminate,"8 may
have resulted in a deep intrusion into the right to free exercise of
religion.
ANDREW ROSEN
78. See Brief of Appellant at 42-48 (never distinguishes beliefs from acts); Brief of Appel-
lee at 15 ("We are now concerned with the religious beliefs of a school or church and not with
a particular individual.").
79. See notes 18, 57 & 58 supra.
80. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883).
81. Miami News, Feb. 15, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 2.
82. Miami Herald, Feb. 22, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 2.
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